From Russia With Love

The use of polonium 210 in the poisoning death of Alexander Litvinenko has opened a parallel and bone-chilling storyline.  There is a growing concern that the inability of the Russians to adequately secure their nuclear facilities is contributing to an active black market in radioactive substances:

An investigation was under way last night into Russia's black market trade in radioactive materials amid concern that significant quantities of polonium 210, the substance that killed former spy Alexander Litvinenko, are being stolen from poorly protected Russian nuclear sites.

 And just how substantial a problem is this?

One of the few figures available, on a database compiled by researchers at Stanford University in the US, revealed that about 40kg of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium were stolen from poorly protected nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union between 1991 and 2002. Although the IAEA has no confirmation of polonium finding its way into the underground trade, there have been several unconfirmed reports of thefts.

In 1993 the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists reported that 10kg of polonium had disappeared from the Sarov, which produces the rare radioactive material and is described as Russia's own version of Los Alamos, the US government's nuclear research base in New Mexico.

Globally there have been more than 300 cases during the past four years where individuals have been caught trying to smuggle radioactive material. In 2005 there were 103 confirmed incidents of trafficking and other unauthorised activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials, many involving Russia.

Sound like a pretty big problem to me.  Even so, there's this perplexing statement from an IAEA official: 

More than anything, the death of the London-based former KGB spy has placed Russia's still thriving trade in radioactive material under scrutiny. 'From the terrorism threat standpoint, these cases are of little concern but they show security vulnerabilities at facilities,' said an IAEA spokesman.

Are we just supposed to accept the IAEA's word that their is unlikely to be a nexus between poorly guarded Russian nuclear facilities, theft of radioactive materials from these facilities, a black market for the nuclear substances and terrorists looking for biological, chemical and nuclear weapons?  I'd like to have the official explain the rationale for why we shouldn't be concerned rather than just brushing the issue aside.

The thought of these radioactive materials being bought and sold should make everyone uncomfortable.  It should also raise questions as to why the Russians aren't providing enough security and what the IAEA is doing to help.  According to a March 2005 official document entitled, "Nuclear Terrorism:  Identifying and Combating the Risks," the IAEA recognizes four distinct threats related to nuclear materials:

The IAEA categorizes four potential nuclear security risks: the theft of a nuclear weapon; the acquisition of nuclear materials for the construction of nuclear explosive devices; the malicious use of radioactive sources — including so-called "dirty bombs"; and the radiological hazards caused by an attack on, or sabotage of, a facility or a transport vehicle.

According to the document, the IAEA does understand (well that's a relief) the danger of such materials getting into the hands of terrorists: 

These risks are real and current, but they are not all the same. While the probability of a nuclear explosive device being acquired and used by terrorists is relatively small, it cannot be dismissed, and the consequences would be devastating. On the other hand, a dirty bomb would likely have far less impact in terms of human life, but the relative accessibility of radiological sources make it more likely that such an event could occur.

By their own admission, the greater the accessibility of radiological sources, the greater the likelihood for their use.  The IAEA seems to be primarily interested in the degree of carnage and death, not carnage and death in and of itself.  Perhaps this is what was meant by the IAEA official's statement that, "From the terrorism threat standpoint, these cases are of little concern but they show security vulnerabilities at facilities."  It's not exactly confidence inspiring if, in fact, the IAEA is resigned to the fact that these materials will be used to kill people, and that the agency's focus is to prevent the occurrence of only large "events."  That begs the question of what constitutes a large event?  Twenty dead, fifty dead, one hundred dead, one thousand dead?  That's not good enough in a post 9-11 world.

The following statement seems to indicate how large a problem the IAEA thinks the illicit procurement of the materials actually is:

Some experts share the view of the Director General of the United Kingdom Security Service, who said in August 2003: "It will only be a matter of time before a crude version of a [chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear] attack is launched at a major Western city." To date, the IAEA´s own database on illicit trafficking has recorded, since 1993, over 650 confirmed incidents of trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive material. Last year alone, nearly 100 such incidents occurred, 11 of which involved nuclear material. While the majority of trafficking incidents do not involve nuclear material, and while most of the radioactive materials involved are of limited radiological concern, the number of incidents shows that the measures to control and secure nuclear and other radioactive materials need to be improved.

So what are they actually doing to mitigate the threat?  To the document:

Our first objective is to assist States in preventing any illicit or non-peaceful use of nuclear or other radioactive materials — including acts of terrorism. This requires: effective physical protection of these materials in use, storage and transport; protection of related nuclear facilities; and strong State systems for accounting for and control of nuclear material. The IAEA has been providing a range of international advisory service missions, training workshops and technical guidance documents — on nuclear security, physical protection, ´design basis threat´ assessments, and nuclear material accounting, to assist States in implementing these preventive measures.

This and other IAEA documents seem to indicate that the IAEA provides advisory and support services regarding security, but the responsibility of guarding each facility falls solely within the purview of the host nation.  That's fine, except when the host nation is doing a poor job because of either a lack of manpower or rank corruption.  Allow me to suggest that perhaps securing these facilities might be the type of job that the United Nations is actually competent enough to handle.  Send in the U.N. blue helmets.  The host nations must, of course, grant permission for the added security, but the security benefits of containing these nuclear materials would be profound.  Truly resolving this particular threat requires that every facility have adequate security.  As President Bush has said on numerous occassions, we have to be right 100% of the time.  The terrorists only have to be right one time.

Comments

[technologist]

Polonium-210 is easily available, contrary to what NYT tries to spin. Just Google yourself, and you see that there is no need to raid Russian (or anyone else's) nuclear facilities to get it. A credit card with hundred dollars limit is enough.

[Joe]

Thanks for your comment!

Even if that's the case with polonium 210, the broader point of the post is that radioactive substances in general are being foisted from unsecured Russian facilities. Even if you are correct regarding the ease at obtaining polonium 210, what about these other dangerous substances?